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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MARIAN CORNWALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY
CLUB,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 9568

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover compensation on
a written personal service contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court; from a verdict
and judgment for the ·plaintiff, defendant appeals.·
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of a portion of the
judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of
law.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a professional interior decorator.
On September 22, 1959, defendant engaged the services of plaintiff by written contract to perform
interior decorating services in connection with defendant's new club house facilitaties located in Salt
Lake County, Utah (the contract is part of the
record at Pages 4 and 5). Plaintiff''s services vvere
to include the selection of carpets, drapes, furniture,
light fixtures, fabrics and colors, and to supervise
the installation of the furnishings and fixtures.
Her fee was six ( 6 7o) percent of the cost of certain of the furnishings.
The contract was for the term of one year.
Appellant had an option under the contract to renew the same for an additional year. If the contract was not renewed, appellant would owe to respondent the sum of $1,000.00 as additional fee.
The contract was not renewed and defendant
refused to pay the $1,000.00 additional fee and certain items of account not involved in this appeal.
Suit was commenced January 24, 1961.

2
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT ARE CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND WERE PROPERLY ENFORCED BY THE LOWER COURT.

Paragraph 6 of the contract provides the basis
of contention on this appeal. It reads:
"This con tract shall be for a term of
one ( 1) year from the date hereof, and may
be renewed by the Club upon the s'ame terms,
for an additional one ( 1) year, by giving
written notice of renewal to the decorator at
least thirty ( 30) days prior to the date of
expiration. In the event that the contract
is not renewed, the Club shall pay the decorator an additional fee of One Thousand
( $1,000.00) Dollars."
Appellant (who prepared the contract, R. 20)
is now dissatisfied with the clear meaning and effect of Paragraph 6 and is asking this court to
ll10dify it.
Appellant now wants Paragraph 6 to read and
mean that the sum of $1,000.00 would be owing
to Miss Cornwall (respondent) only in the event
that other work were yet to be done by the decorator for which a fee would be payable.
In this request, appellant is met squarely with
a well settled principal of law.
"A cour't cannot make a new contract for the
parties". Elgren vs. Snyder, 285 Pac. 640
(Utah).
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"Generally speaking, neither of the parties,
nor the court has any right to ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed
merely because it may subject one of the
parties to hardship, but they must be enforced "in accordance with the intention as
... manifested by the language used by the
parties to the contract." Ephraim Theatre
Company vs. Hawk, 321 Pac. 2d 221 (Utah).
In an effort to overcome the effect of these
decisions, appellant urges that the record be searched
and the contract construed and interpreted in the
light of the negotiations and circumstances of the
parties at and after the execution of the contract.
Appellants do not, indeed can not contend that the
contract is ambiguous as ·written, but state that it
becomes so after reference is made to extraneous
matters.
Here again, appellant is confronted with well
settled law.
"Tt would defeat the very purpose of formal
contracts to permit a party to invoke the use
of words or conduct inconsistent with its
terms to prove that the parties did not mean
what they said, or to use such inconsistent
words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty
or ambiguity where none would otherwise
exist." Ephraim Theatre Company vs. Hawk,
(supra).
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts
we seek to determine the intentions of the
parties. But is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold con4
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tracting parties to their clear and under-.
standable language deliberately committed
to writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto . . . It is not unreasonable
to hold one responsible for language which he
himself espouses." Jensen's Used Cars v.
James T. Rice, 823 P. 2d 259, (Utah).
12 Am. Jur. Contracts §233
"As already in tim a ted, preliminary negotiations can not be allowed to contradict or vary
the terms of a written contract.''
IBID. §248
HThe foregoing rule that the surrounding circumstances should be considered in the interpretation of a contract appl'ies for the language considered alone is susceptible to more
than one meaning. All authorities agree that
the surrounding circumstances should be considered where the meaning conveyed by the
words alone i's not plain. That is, where the
meaning conveyed is not plain if the surrounding circumstances are ndt considered. Apparently, however, the rule that the surrounding
circumstances should be considered does not
apply where the language of a written agreement is plain and is not susceptible of more
than one meaning." (Italics supplied)

Additionally, it should be pointed out that the
record does not support appellant's theory that a
condition be interpreted into Paragraph 6.
Both parties testified to the purpose of this
paragraph.
5
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Appellant: (Mr. Safford who negotiated the contract)
" ... it w·as put in there for a specific purpose which Miss Cornwall and I discussed on
several different occasion's, the purpose of it
being to make sure that the contract was
completed."
Respondent:
''When I met with Norval Safford in discussion pertaining to the contract, the $1,000.00
clause was put in to assure me of adequate
compensation for doing this .particular pro. ject." 1
Mr. Safford testified further on direct examination:
"Q. Now, did you have any discussion
with her concerning whether or not that sum
would be paid in the event all the work was
done-; that is, as outlined or contemplated at
that time?
A. To the best of my knowledge, the
question never even -came ilp in my mind. It
was siinply a que'stion:af completing the work."

We thus see that the condition appellant seeks
to engraft upon Paragraph 6 was not even a subject of discussion between the parties and the testimony cited by appellant is not inconsistent with the
enforcement of this term of the contract.
1

Excerpts of testimony taken from Page 5 of Appellant's Brief.

6
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To interpret Paragraph 6 in the manner appellant wishe's, it would be necessary to
( 1)
( 1)
('3)

completely change and overrule the law
regarding writen instruments.
find and declare that this unambiguous
contract is in fact ambiguous, and
without any supporting evidence, speculate on the intent of the parties and
construct for them a new contract that
neither envisioned.

.7
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POlNT II.
THE CONTRACT WAS NOT TERMINATED BY
PERFORMANCE AS APPELLANT SUGGESTS.

Appellant states that during the initial year of
the contract, it was completed and, therefore, there
was nothing to renew. rt ba:ses 'its argument on its
claim that it had purchased all its furnishings during the year. This argument is untenable because
appellant has overlooked the nature of the contract,
its terms and the testimony and exhibits of respondent.
The contract is one for services. The fee is ba:sed
on six ( 6 7o ) percent of the purchase price of certain
furnishings and fixtures with provisions of a minimum fee and an option to renew. A primary term
of one year is provided. One of the duties incumbent upon respondent during \the one year term is
''to advise and consult with the building committee
and work in cooperation with it (R. 4) ." Even if
other duties under the contract such as purchase
and installation of furnishings vvere discharged, the
du ty to advise and consult can not possibly be discharged until the year ends. She must remain available to advise and consult with the building committee at any time during the year.
1

This contract is not unlike that of an attorney
and client contract wherein an attorney is retained
for a period of one year for the purpose of advice
8
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and prosecution of claims with provision that his
fee would be based on a percentage of sums collected. No one would contend, certainly, that the
contract had terminated because all the claims had
been collected in six months.

There is, furthermore, adequate evidence that
the contract had not been terminated by performance.
"Q. Let me ask you this, Miss Cornwall.
Do you consider that your services are completed for the Willow Creek Country Club?
A.

No, I do not." (R. 27)

An exchange of letters corroborated this testimony (Exhibits P9 and PlO). Miss Cornwall outlines certain modifications and additions, she
thought necessary for the club house facilities. The
President of the Club replied stating tha't she would
probably be contacted by the building committee.
She was not, however, contacted by the building committee.·
A fair interpretation of the contract shows that
it could not by its terms be terminated by performance, and furthermore, the record shows that there
\vas work yet to be done.
9
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NOTE:
Appellant does not ask that Paragraph 6 be
voided on the grounds that it is a penalty, but its
repeated reference to Paragraph 6 as a "penalty
clause" in the record and in its brief does merit
a comment.
This action_was brought on the cont:r:_a~t for the
agreed compensation. It is not an action for breach
of contract.
The applicable rules are set forth in the California case of Payne vs. Pathe Studios, 44 Pac.. 2d,
59R (CaL).:·
'~That the supplemental provision to pay the
$5,000.00, as representing four weeks' guarantee, was neither in the nature of a penalty
nor an· effort to proVide for liquidated damages, appears clear to us. This action is not
one for damages based upon the breach of a
contract of hiring, hut is an action based upon
the contract itself, as construed and interpreted, upon an express promise to pay for
at least four weeks' services ... Such agreements are upheld and the minin1um rate or
wage has been sustained as the true measure
of recovery, the promise to pay such sum
'being a part of the direct obligation of the
contract and in no sense a covenant for.liquida ted damages in cases of breach . .··. ·The
same reasoning and authorities furnish a negative answer to appellant's question as to
whether the pron1ise to pay the $5,000 was a
penalty. Provisions for a penalty as well as
for liquidated damages apply only in case of
a breach of a con tract.''
·
10
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CONCLUSION
The contract in this case was properly interpreted and enforced by the lower court. Its decision
should be affir1ned.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney For Plaintiff-Respondent
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